Marriage does not necessarily end at a single decisive moment. Between the dissolution of a marriage and the beginning of a new one lies a period of time that many societies have recognized under different names. The Romans, for example, imposed a mandatory mourning period of ten months during which a widow was prohibited from remarrying, according to Roman law, aspects of which are discussed in Agnieszka Kacprzak’s research paper, The Widow’s Duty of Mourning and the Ancient Concept of Pregnancy.
In Judaism, a widow or divorced woman is not permitted to remarry until three months have passed, as stated in the Mishnah, Yevamot (4:10). The text states that “…other women may neither become engaged nor marry until they have waited three months following the end of their previous marriage. This waiting period is necessary to ensure that the identity of a child’s father is clear and certain if the woman gives birth shortly after entering a new marriage…”
European civil laws similarly established waiting periods during which widowed or divorced women were prohibited from remarrying. In France, for example, Law No. 1803-03-17, published on 27 March 1803, stipulated that “a woman may not remarry until three hundred days have elapsed since the dissolution of her previous marriage. This period ends if she gives birth following her husband’s death, or if she presents a medical certificate confirming that she is not pregnant.”
France subsequently abolished this restriction under Article 228 of the Civil Code, which states that it was “repealed by Law No. 2004-439 of 26 May 2004, Article 23, published in the Official Journal on 27 May 2004, and effective from 1 January 2005.”
Japan also abolished the mandatory waiting period that prevented divorced or widowed women from remarrying, effective 1 April 2024, under Article 733 of the Civil Code.
The iddah (waiting period) occupies a sensitive position in contemporary debates about religion, family, and women’s rights. The first point to emphasize is that feminism is not a single institution with a unified position, but rather encompasses multiple schools of thought. One is the liberal rights-based approach, which evaluates every rule against the principles of freedom to marry and equality before the law. Its reference point is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.
To begin with, there is a rights-based approach that raises a simple question: If a marriage has ended, why should only a woman's freedom to remarry be restricted, while a man can remarry immediately? This is the same question that led Equality Now, in an article titled Japan – The Civil Code, to describe Japan's mandatory waiting period for women before remarriage, which was subsequently abolished, as a form of sex-based discrimination.
This approach finds its foundation in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly through Resolution 34/180 on December 18, 1979. Article 16 requires States Parties to eliminate discrimination against women in matters relating to marriage and family relations and to ensure that women and men have "the same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution."
Although the Convention does not explicitly mention iddah, its general principles are used to evaluate family laws. From this perspective, any sex-based restriction requires a precise and proportionate justification. If the sole purpose is to prevent uncertainty over paternity, early pregnancy testing and DNA analysis can achieve that objective, as Tomohiro Osaki argues in an article titled Japan's Top Court Upholds Same-Surname Rule for Married Couples, Strikes Down Remarriage Ban for Women. If the purpose is symbolic mourning, why is a widower not required to observe a comparable waiting period? This question is raised by Syamsul Hilal and Sumber Mulia Harahap in their study titled 'Iddah in the View of Islam and Feminists.
Another perspective is Islamic feminism, which takes the Quran as its starting point and distinguishes between Sharia as divine will and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) as a human interpretation that may, at times, reflect male-centered perspectives. This distinction was highlighted by Dr. Hassan Taysir Shammout in his article titled Islamic Feminism: To What Extent Is It Compatible with Islamic Sharia?.
A legislative reform approach proposes reciprocal obligations for both spouses, as discussed in a study published in Volume 18, Issue 2 (2021) of the Indonesian journal Al-'Adalah, titled 'Iddah in the View of Islam and Feminists, by Syamsul Hilal and Sumber Mulia Harahap.
The study begins by examining historians’ disagreement over whether iddah existed before Islam. Some deny its existence, citing a hadith concerning Asma bint Yazid ibn al-Sakan, who was divorced during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), at a time when no waiting period was prescribed for divorced women. The Quranic verses concerning iddah were subsequently revealed, making her the first woman in connection with whom these verses were revealed. Others maintain that iddah existed before Islam in a harsh form, drawing on accounts cited by al-Shafi'i in Al-Umm and al-Qurtubi in Al-Jami' li-Ahkam al-Qur'an.
The study then presents the views of Indonesian feminists who regard the restriction of iddah to women as a form of patriarchal discrimination, referencing Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics (1970). It also highlights inconsistencies within Indonesian legislation. The Civil Code, inherited from the Dutch colonial period, prohibits women from remarrying for 300 days and prevents divorced spouses from remarrying each other for one year, whereas Islamic jurisprudence approaches iddah from a different perspective.
According to the study, on October 4, 2004, a working group on gender mainstreaming within the Ministry of Religious Affairs submitted a proposal to the Indonesian Parliament recommending that iddah apply to both spouses and that its duration be calculated from the date of the marriage contract rather than from consummation.
The study rejects this proposal on the grounds that the Quranic verses prescribing iddah meet the criteria for definitive interpretation, with the exception of the term quru', which may refer either to menstruation or to periods of purity. Accordingly, it argues that there is no scope for independent legal interpretation (ijtihad) regarding these provisions. The study concludes that men and women were created with distinct physical and emotional characteristics suited to their respective roles, and that imposing formal equality in this context would lead to serious problems.
There is a socioeconomic approach that focuses on what actually happens to women after divorce, as reflected in Policy Brief No. 5, published by Musawah, a global movement that seeks to advance the human rights of women living in Muslim contexts.
Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi laid the foundations of Islamic feminism through her books The Political Harem (1987) and The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam (1990). She argued that much of the discrimination against women attributed to Islamic texts was imposed by men who monopolized their interpretation from an early period.
American scholar Amina Wadud has been a key member of the Malaysian organization Sisters in Islam since 1989. She further developed her approach in her book Inside the Gender Jihad (2006). According to the German website Qantara, Wadud denounces patriarchy, which she considers contrary to Islam.
After this historical journey, we arrive at Islamic Sharia, where iddah (the waiting period) cannot be understood independently of marriage itself, which always precedes separation. Marriage is a religious contract involving intertwined psychological, physical, and material dimensions. The Quran describes it as a solemn covenant, as stated in Surah An-Nisa:
“And how could you take it back after having been intimate with one another, and she has taken from you a solemn covenant?”
Article 101 of Qatar’s Family Law No. 22 of 2006, which is derived from Islamic Sharia, identifies four forms of marital separation: divorce initiated by the husband (talaq), divorce by mutual agreement (khulʿ), judicial annulment (faskh), and the death of either spouse. The same law also addresses irregular and void marriages in Articles 51 and 52.
Divorce (Talaq): The husband has the right to initiate divorce, which is revocable on the first and second occasions. As stated in Surah Al-Baqarah:
“Divorce is twice. Then, either retain [her] in an acceptable manner or release [her] with good treatment.”
According to the IslamWeb website, the husband pronouncing divorce must possess sound mental capacity, have reached puberty, act with intention, and exercise free choice.
The website explains that an irregular divorce (talaq al-bidʿi), such as divorce pronounced during menstruation, is considered legally effective by consensus among the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, despite being prohibited. The Zahiri school, however, does not recognize its validity. This position was also adopted by Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim, as well as contemporary Salafi scholars Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen. In Jaʿfari Shia jurisprudence, divorce pronounced while a woman is menstruating or experiencing postpartum bleeding is invalid.
Article 108 of Qatar’s Family Law No. 22 of 2006 adopts the position that divorce pronounced during menstruation, or during a period of purity in which sexual intercourse has occurred, does not take effect. The law also does not recognize conditional divorce intended to compel someone to perform or refrain from an action, and considers a divorce pronounced with a numerical designation to constitute only one divorce.
Khulʿ (Divorce Initiated by the Wife Through Compensation): In khulʿ, a woman obtains release from the marriage by offering financial compensation. This is based on the Quranic verse in Surah Al-Baqarah:
“But if you fear that they will not keep within the limits of Allah, then there is no blame upon either of them concerning that by which she ransoms herself.”
According to IslamOnline, the majority of Islamic jurists classify khulʿ as a form of divorce. However, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, according to the widely reported position attributed to him, and Al-Shafiʿi in his earlier opinion, regarded it as an annulment that does not reduce the number of permissible divorces. Ibn Taymiyyah also adopted this view.
Article 118 of Qatar’s Family Law No. 22 of 2006 adopts this latter position. Article 120 prohibits compensation for khulʿ from taking the form of relinquishing child custody or the rights of children.
If the spouses cannot reach an agreement, Article 122 provides that the court appoints two arbitrators to attempt reconciliation for a period not exceeding six months. If reconciliation fails, and the wife returns the dowry and relinquishes her financial rights, the court orders the dissolution of the marriage.
Judicial Annulment (Faskh): Judicial annulment may occur because of a defect in the marriage contract or circumstances arising after the marriage.
Under Qatar’s Family Law No. 22 of 2006, grounds for judicial annulment include the husband's disappearance to an unknown location for one year or more (Article 144), imprisonment under a final judgment for two years or more (Article 145), and ilaʾ (an oath to abstain from marital relations) or zihar (a prohibited declaration likening one's wife to a woman permanently forbidden in marriage), where the husband refuses to resume marital relations or perform the required expiation (Articles 147 and 150). Apostasy is also addressed under Article 154.
According to Article 105, judicial annulment constitutes an irrevocable separation and does not reduce the number of permissible divorces.
Void and Irregular Marriages: A void marriage is one in which an essential element of the marriage contract is missing. Under Article 52, such a marriage produces no legal effects.
An irregular marriage, by contrast, is one in which a required condition has not been fulfilled. Under Article 51, if the marriage has been consummated, certain legal consequences arise, including the establishment of paternity and the obligation to observe iddah.
Death: The death of either spouse terminates the marital relationship. A widow is entitled to her dowry and her share of the inheritance.
She must observe iddah until the end of her pregnancy if she is pregnant, or for four months and ten days if she is not pregnant, even if the marriage was never consummated.
The concept of iddah (the waiting period) in Islam can be simplified through the analogy of three traffic lights.
Green Light: Separation Without a Waiting Period
If a divorce takes place before the marriage has been consummated, the woman may remarry immediately. As stated in Surah Al-Ahzab:
“O you who believe, when you marry believing women and then divorce them before you have touched them, you have no waiting period to count concerning them…”
A woman divorced before consummation is entitled to half of the dowry specified in the marriage contract, in accordance with the following verse from Surah Al-Baqarah:
“And if you divorce them before you have touched them, but after you have specified a dowry for them, then give them half of what you specified, unless they waive it or the one in whose hand is the marriage contract waives it. And to waive is nearer to righteousness. And do not forget graciousness between yourselves. Indeed, Allah is All-Seeing of what you do.”
Article 158 of Qatar's Family Law No. 22 of 2006 summarizes the circumstances in which a waiting period is not required:
“No waiting period is required before consummation or valid seclusion, except in the case of death.”
Red Light: Separation That Is Almost Irreversible
There are two forms of this separation.
The first occurs following a third divorce, after which the woman cannot remarry her former husband unless she enters into another genuine marriage that is consummated and subsequently ends without any prior deliberate arrangement. She may then return to her first husband under a new marriage contract and with a new dowry.
As stated in Surah Al-Baqarah:
“And if he divorces her [for the third time], she is not lawful to him afterward until she marries a husband other than him. And if he divorces her, there is no blame upon the two of them if they return to each other, provided they believe they can uphold the limits of Allah. These are the limits of Allah, which He makes clear to people who know.”
The second form of red-light separation is li'an (mutual imprecation). This occurs when a husband accuses his wife of adultery but has no witnesses other than himself, and both spouses exchange solemn oaths before a judge.
Under Article 152 of Qatar's Family Law No. 22 of 2006, this results in permanent separation.
According to Al-Jassas in Ahkam al-Qur'an, as cited by Islamweb, Abu Yusuf and Al-Shafi'i held that the spouses could never reunite. Imam Abu Hanifa and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, however, permitted reconciliation if the husband retracted his accusation and the prescribed punishment was carried out against him.
Yellow Light: Separation Subject to a Waiting Period
In this category, the separation does not become final until the prescribed waiting period has been completed.
Article 161 of Qatar's Family Law No. 22 of 2006 outlines the waiting periods as follows:
- For a pregnant woman whose husband has not died, the waiting period ends upon childbirth or miscarriage where the fetus has discernible human features.
- For a menstruating woman, the waiting period consists of three complete menstrual cycles. A claim that the period has ended is not accepted until at least 60 days have passed.
- For a woman who has never menstruated or has reached menopause, the waiting period is three months. If menstruation resumes before its completion, she must begin a new waiting period of three menstrual cycles.
- For a woman experiencing prolonged bleeding without an established menstrual pattern, the waiting period is three months. If she has a known pattern that she remembers, she follows it when calculating her waiting period.
- For a woman whose menstruation has ceased before menopause, the waiting period is three months, accompanied by an official medical certificate confirming that she is not pregnant.
The Waiting Period Following a Revocable Divorce
The waiting period following a revocable divorce is the beating heart of this system.
As stated in Surah Al-Baqarah:
“Divorced women shall wait concerning themselves for three menstrual periods. It is not lawful for them to conceal what Allah has created in their wombs, if they believe in Allah and the Last Day. Their husbands have a greater right to take them back during that period if they desire reconciliation. And women have rights similar to their obligations, according to what is reasonable, although men have a degree over them. And Allah is Almighty, All-Wise.”
A woman observing her waiting period may not be expelled from her marital home, nor may she leave it, as stated in Surah At-Talaq:
“…Do not turn them out of their homes, nor should they leave, unless they commit a clear act of immorality. These are the limits set by Allah. Whoever transgresses Allah’s limits has certainly wronged himself. You never know; perhaps Allah will bring about a change of circumstances after that.”
Qatar's Family Law No. 22 of 2006 adopts this principle in Article 159:
“A divorced woman and a widow shall observe their waiting period in the marital home designated for them.”
During a revocable divorce, the possibility of reconciliation remains, and the woman continues to have the legal status of a wife in this respect.
If her husband dies while she is observing the waiting period for a revocable divorce, she transitions to the waiting period prescribed for widowhood.
Article 163 states:
“If the husband dies while the woman is observing the waiting period for a revocable divorce, she shall transition to the waiting period for widowhood, and the time already elapsed shall not be counted.”
The waiting period, therefore, is not a punishment but a deliberate opportunity to preserve the family before its final dissolution.
The Waiting Period Following a Husband's Death
The waiting period following a husband's death is independent of menstruation and consummation of the marriage.
The Waiting Period Following a Husband's Death
The waiting period following a husband's death is independent of menstruation and consummation of the marriage.
As stated in Surah Al-Baqarah:
“And those of you who die and leave wives behind, their wives shall wait for four months and ten days. When they have completed their prescribed term, there is no blame upon you for what they do concerning themselves in an acceptable manner. And Allah is fully aware of what you do.”
This ruling represented a relaxation of a harsh pre-Islamic mourning practice that lasted an entire year.
A narration in Sahih Al-Bukhari recounts:
Zaynab said: “I heard Umm Salama say that a woman came to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and said, ‘O Messenger of Allah, my daughter's husband has died, and she is suffering from an eye ailment. May she apply kohl?’ The Messenger of Allah ﷺ replied, ‘No.’ He repeated this two or three times, each time saying, ‘No.’ Then he said, ‘It is only four months and ten days, whereas in the pre-Islamic period one of you would throw a piece of dung at the completion of a year.’”
The Waiting Period Following Khul'
The waiting period following khul' (a wife-initiated dissolution of marriage involving compensation) is a matter of scholarly disagreement, according to Islamweb.
The majority of scholars maintain that it is the same as the waiting period following divorce.
However, it has been reported from Uthman, Ibn Umar, and Ibn Abbas that the waiting period is a single menstrual cycle.
This position is based on a narration recorded by Al-Tirmidhi and Abu Dawud, in which Ibn Abbas reported that the wife of Thabit ibn Qays obtained a khul' separation from her husband, and the Prophet ﷺ instructed her to observe a waiting period of one menstrual cycle.
Question: Is There a Waiting Period for Men in Islam?
Islamic law does not prescribe an iddah waiting period for men. However, certain temporary restrictions may prevent a man from entering into a particular marriage.
For example, a man who has divorced his wife through a revocable divorce cannot marry her sister until his former wife's waiting period has ended.
Similarly, a man who has four wives and divorces one of them cannot marry a fifth woman until the divorced wife's waiting period has ended.
If a man's wife dies, however, he may remarry immediately.
In Islam, iddah (the prescribed waiting period) is not merely a rule for establishing paternity. Rather, it encompasses several purposes: determining whether a woman is pregnant to prevent confusion over lineage; giving spouses an opportunity to reconsider their decision; observing a period of mourning that expresses respect for the deceased’s family; honoring the institution of marriage itself; and allowing a widow time to regain her emotional balance following her husband’s death, rather than entering another marriage while under psychological distress. If she is pregnant and gives birth, she has a newborn who may help ease the grief of losing her husband and who needs financial support. There is therefore no impediment to her remarrying immediately after childbirth.
For a Muslim, there is no greater justification than the words of Allah in Surah Al-Ahzab:
"It is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in their affair. And whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger has certainly strayed into clear error."
Nor is there a stronger argument than the words of Allah in Surah An-Nisa:
"But no, by your Lord, they will not truly believe until they make you judge concerning that over which they dispute among themselves, and then find within themselves no discomfort concerning what you have decided, and submit in full submission."
If rational justifications carry greater weight in a Muslim's eyes, then that person must reexamine their faith. By placing their own reasoning on the same level as the Creator, they have, in practice, committed shirk (associating partners with Allah), even if they do not acknowledge doing so.
Iblis (Satan) did not deny the existence of the Creator; rather, he objected to His command, as reflected in the words of Allah in Surah Sad:
"He said, 'O Iblis, what prevented you from prostrating to what I created with My own hands? Were you arrogant, or were you among the exalted?' He replied, 'I am better than him. You created me from fire, and You created him from clay.'"
Allah did not engage Iblis in a debate over his objection. Instead, the divine response came immediately in the following verses:
"He said, 'Then leave it, for you are accursed. And indeed, My curse shall be upon you until the Day of Judgment.' He said, 'My Lord, then grant me respite until the Day they are resurrected.' He said, 'Then you are among those granted respite until the Day of the appointed time.' He said, 'By Your might, I will surely lead them all astray, except Your sincere and devoted servants among them.'"
